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BY WILnLAm H. SCmmmER*
With respect to public utilities legislation the 100th General
Assembly concentrated its efforts on the telephone industry and
enacted legislation which it considered designed to force the tele-
phone industry to improve its service.' Comparatively few people
realize the nature of the telephone industry in Ohio. There are
181 separate telephone companies in the state of which 179 are
independents. The other two companies are Ohio Bell and the
Cincinnati and Suburban Telephone Company, a Bell affiliate.
The 179 independents serve about 21 per cent of the population of
the state and 72 per cent of the area.
The war, with its attendant shortages, has been the source of
many of the problems of the telephone industry. The pent-up de-
mand for telephones in both urban and rural areas has never
been completely satisfied and prosperous times have made the
telephone economically available to many people who formerly
could not have afforded one. This growth has required much ad-
ditional investment in plant facilities and in many cases a complete
change over from the existing equipment has been necessary.
While the investment in telephone facilities has increased im-
mensely during this period it has not been able to keep up with
public demand to the extent necessary to avoid complaints and as
a result there has been agitation for legislation requiring that better
service be rendered by the telephone companies. Another cause of
complaints has been the increased rates required by the greater
plant investment made under present high prices without commen-
surate improvements in service.
The legislature tackled the problem by seeking methods that
would make it economically undesirable for a telephone company
to render inadequate service. As a result of this approach many of
the sections of the Revised Code which dealt with the financing
of public utilities have been amended. Other major changes con-
cern sections relating to records and areas of service. The bill, in
essence, provides for the following changes in the public utility
laws:
Complete records of all of the proceedings including a trans-
cript of all testimony and exhibits as well as findings of fact are
now required in all contested cases before the Public Utilities
Commission instead of merely resumes of the facts.2
* Of the firm of Power, Griffith & Jones, Columbus, Ohio; Member of the
Ohio Bar.
I Amended Substitute House Bill No. 134.
2 OMo REv. CODE § 4903.09 (GENr. CODE § 614-46a).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Reports, records ,files, books, accounts, etc. are to be open to
inspection by interested parties or their attorneys instead of the
public generally with the right of the commission to withhold
such information for a limited period of time.3
The Public Utilities Commission may now require any tele-
phone company to file, along with its annual report, supplementary
reports of each exchange area owned or operated by it, in such
detail as the commission may prescribe. Upon the request of fifteen
per cent of the subscribers of any telephone exchange, the Public
Utilities Commission must require the report to be made for that
exchange area.4
All telephone companies, unless otherwise ordered by the
commission must file with the commission a copy of every con-
tract, agreement, note bond or other arrangement entered into
with any telephone management, service, or operating company.'
All other utilities will still be subject to the existing section which
says that the commission may require such information to be filed.
The Public Utilities Commission shall require every tele-
phone company to carry a proper and adequate depreciation or
deferred maintenance account and shall ascertain, determine, and
prescribe what are proper and adequate charges in each exchange
area of such company.0 This is one of several sections which has
been amended to treat telephone companies differently than other
public utilities.
On and after January 1, 1955, it shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of inadequate service by a telephone company to have
more than ten subscribers on any one telephone line in companies
serving five hundred telephones or more.7
The commission may prescribe reasonable standards of tele-
phone service which are to be the minimum requirements for the
furnishing of adequate telephone service.8
A series of sections were added that seek to put new companies
in the areas where the existing companies are rendering inadequate
service. One of these sections would permit the commission to
authorize another telephone company to render service in an area
where the service of the existing telephone company is adequate.9
The commission may recommend that where the telephone
service is inadequate the facilities of the telephone companies be
3 OHIo REv. CODE § 4905.07 (GEN. CODE § 614-38).
4 OHIo REv. CODE § 4905.14 (GEN. CODE § 614-48).
SOMo REV. CODE § 4905.16 (GEN. CODE § 614-9).
6 OmO REV. CODE § 4905.18 (GEN. CODE § 614-49).
70nro REv. CODE § 4905.23 (GEx. CoDE § 614-12a).
8 Omo Rsv. CODE § 4905.231.
9 OsIo Rsv. CODE § 4905.241.
[Vol. 14
PUBLIC UTILITY LEGISLATION
integrated, merged, or consolidated with other telephone com-
panies.10
In the event that no telephone company wants to go into the
area of inadequate service the commission either on its own motion
or upon petition of the residents of the area may order a telephone
company serving an adjacent area to render service in the area
receiving inadequate service provided that the commission finds
that the rendition of such service in the area receiving inadequate
service will not prevent the company so ordered to serve from
earning a fair return on the value of the property devoted by it
to the public service."
This section, in effect, compels a telephone company to devote
certain property to the public service against its wishes. The courts
have prevented the commission from compelling utilities to serve
areas that they did not profess or wish to serve.
12
It is unlawful for a telephone company found to be unwilling
or unable to render adequate service to continue operations within
such area of inadequate service after the date on which another
telephone company, either authorized or ordered to enter the area,
institutes service therein.' 3 These four sections grouped together
give the Public Utilities Commission power to alter the balance
between the various companies in the state and could very con-
ceivably result in the elimination of many of the companies.
Notice of the hearing of service complaints by newspaper ad-
vertisements are required in the counties in which the complaints
arise. Complaints must be heard in the local area upon the request
of one hundred subscribers or five per cent of the subscribers to
any telephone exchange, whichever is smaller.
14
The maximum penalty for the violation of an order of the
commission by a telephone company is increased from $1000 per
day to $5000 per day.'"
An application filed by a telephone company for issuance of
securities for money only shall state that the company is not in
violation of certain sections of the statute or orders of the commis-
sion, or, if the company is in violation, that unless approved by the
1 Omo Rnv. CODE § 4905.242.
11 OHIO REv. CODE § 4905.243.
12 It was held in Nicoma Park Telephone Compdny vs. State, 180 P. 2d 69,
that to compel a telephone company to extend its service to a city, town, or
community it has not undertaken or professed to serve and which it does
not desire to serve, is tantamount to an appropriation of private property
forpublic use without just compensation.
13 OHIo REv. CODE § 4905.244.
14OHIo REV. CODE § 4905.26 (GEN. CODE § 614.21).
IS Orno REv. CODE § 4905.381.
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commission none of the proceeds will be used for expansion into
or acquisition of additional territory.16
A similar provision applies to the application for the issuance
of securities to be used partly or wholly for property, services, or
considerations other than money.17
One of the most far reaching changes in the public utilities
law is contained in Section 4905.46 of the Revised Code which
provides that no telephone company shall declare any cash, stock,
bond, or scrip dividend or divide the proceeds of the sale of any
stock, bond, or scrip among its common or voting shareholders
while such telephone is in violation of any order of the commission,
or against which telephone company there exists a finding of in-
adequate service, except when the Public Utilities Commission
makes a finding after hearing and notice that such dividend will
in no way postpone compliance with any order or affect the ade-
quacy of service rendered or to be rendered by such telephone com-
pany. Provided that if a telephone company, while in violation of
any order of the commission, or against which there exists a finding
of inadequate service, desires to declare a cash dividend without
the consent of the commission, it shall set in a special reserve fund
a sum of money equivalent to the amount necessary to pay the
proposed dividend, which, while said company is in violation of
said order, or against which such finding exists, may be expended
only with the consent of the commission.' 8 This section is one of
the most important in the bill and its effects will be widely felt
since it is so closely tied to the financing of the telephone com-
panies. Equity capital will probably be more difficult to obtain
since the dividends will be under the control of the commission.
The bill often refers to the term "finding of inadequate service"
and if such "finding" exists no dividend may be paid without the
commission's consent. That term has not been defined in the bill
but if the word "finding" is used as elsewhere in the Public Utilities
Act it will be an exceedingly rare occurrence for a telephone com-
pany to have no "finding of inadequate service" against it. A prob-
lem also exists in determining when a finding of inadequate serv-
ice no longer exists. This bill goes much farther in the regulation
of public utilities than any in the past and its full import will not
be apparent until the act is in effect.
16 Omo REv. CODE § 4905.41 (GEN. CODE § 614-64).
17 Oio Rv. CODE § 4905.41 (GEar. CODE § 614-64).
18 OHmo REv. CoDE § 4905.46 (GEN. CODE § 614-58).
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ERvix H. POLLACK*
STATE TRADE-MARKS
Sub. S. B. No. 117, passed by the 100th General Assembly of
Ohio, establishes a uniform procedure for filing and registering
trade-marks in the state. Prior to this enactment, the trade-mark
requirements were covered by a number of diversified acts affect-
Ing a variety of commodities. The new act, which repeals many
of the old provisions, consolidates most of the trade-mark measures
under a single procedure.' The law, paralleling the federal Lanham
Trade-Mark Act in some minor respects, conforms generally to the
"model" state trade-mark bill.2
The objectives of the "model" trade-mark law are: 1) to pro-
vide uniform registration procedures within a state and for the
several states, 2) to grant permissive as against mandatory regis-
tration, and 3) to leave common law trade-marks undisturbed.3
While uniform, permissive trade-mark legislation is less ob-
jectionable than either fragmentary or mandatory statutes, state
trade-mark law is generally ineffective. The statements made in
1929 and repeated in 1934 by the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, critical of the exaggerated claims given to state regis-
tration by "self-styled specialists," still control. 4
Voluntary state trade-mark laws are helpful in only exceptional
cases.5 It is true that a state statute is the only medium for regis-
* Associate Professor of Law and Law Librarian, The Ohio State Univer-
sity.
I The law relating to timber trade-marks remains unaffected by this
legislation. On-o REv. CODE §§ 980.01 (GEN. CODE §§ 6228) et seq.
2 Ohio is the seventh state to enact the "model" act. The "model" bill
has received the approval of the National Association of Secretaries of
State and the Drafting Committee of the Council of State Governments;
however, the United States Trade-Mark Association has not yet seen fit
to consider the measure. The other states which have adopted the "model"
act are: Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina.
3 Mensor, What Price State Trade-Mark Legislation, 43 TR, -MAx Rn.
541, 542 (1953).
4"Bulletin Regarding Circulars Recently Issued by Certain Self-Styled
'Trade-Mark Specialists,"' reprinted in 17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 740, 741 (1935).
S This statement is intended to apply only to permissive registration.
The United States experienced a wave of mandatory state legislation during
the 1930's. For example, in 1935, sixteen bills were introduced in the state
legislatures, none of which, however, was enacted into law. Attempts to
create the impression that state registration of trade-marks is essential to
protection persisted during the following decade. In 1947, when the Lanham
Act was about to become effective, bills were introduced into the Ohio and
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tration by an owner of a trade-mark who is not engaged in inter-
state commerce, but that is not a singular prerequisite to the pro-
tection of trade-mark rights within the several states. Property in
a trade-mark is acquired at common law by appropriation and use6
and registration under an act, in affirmance of the common law,
cannot confer a title to a trade-mark if a prior right was acquired
by adoption and use.7 Therefore, the act does not vest a title in
the registrant as against another's common law title." It is clear
that while registration creates important procedural rights, it does
not give a right of ownership of the mark.
State registration would be essential to protection only if com-
pulsory registration laws were enacted. But that would be con-
trary to the expressed purpose of the Lanham Act which is to
displace local laws so far as the use of registered marks in inter-
state commerce is concerned. Since a very high percentage of
trade-mark owners use their marks in interstate commerce, they,
in the words of a distinguished trade-mark attorney, "... . want a
single source to which they may go in determining whether a mark
is available, a single point of registration, a reasonable fee, and
avoidance of the confusion and harassment and expense of multiple
jurisdiction."' 0
The deficiencies and discordancies in the prior laws were di-
rectly responsible for the passage of the Lanham Act. In urging
its adoption in 1946, the Senate Committee on Patents gave pointed
emphasis to those defections and the need for "national legislation
along national lines":
"The theory once prevailed that protection of trade-marks was
entirely a state matter and that the right to a mark was a common-
law right. This theory was the basis of previous national trade-
mark statutes. Many years ago the Supreme Court held and has
recently repeated that there is no federal common law. It is obvious
that the states can change the common law with respect to trade-
the Connecticut legislatures affecting mandatory registration. Those meas-
ures were also rejected by the legislatures.
For a fuller account of the developments, see Perry, State Trade-Mark
Legislation, 37 TRADE-MARK REP. 283 (1947). A proposed 1953 California
bill, incorporating features of the "model" act and mandatory provisions of
the present law, is discussed in Mensor, supra, note 3.
6 Filley v. Fassett, 44 Mo. 168 (1869).
7The Coca-Cola Co. v. Stevenson, 276 Fed. 1010, 1016 (S.D. Ill. 1920). See
also Nims, UNFAm COmETroN AxD TRADE-MARKS 734 (4th ed. 1947); Liddy,
The Problem of State Trade-Mark Registrations, 37 Tawnr-uIMx REP. 6,67, 672
(1949).
SThe Coca-Cola Co. v. Stevenson, supra note 7.
960 STAT. 443, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946). See Diggins, Federal and State
Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAw Am CONTELmP. PeoD. 200 (1949).
1 Perry, op. cit. note 5, at 286.
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marks and many of them have, with the possible result that there
may be as many different varieties of common law as there are
states. A man's rights in his trade-mark in one state may differ
widely from the rights which he enjoys in another.
"However, trade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used
in interstate commerce are properly the subject of federal regula-
tion. It would seem as if national legislation along national lines
securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce defi-
nite rights should be enacted and should be enacted now."'"
Local legislation, therefore, should neither conflict with nor
overlap the federal law. At most, it should supplement the Lanham
Act by providing for the registration of trade-marks of intrastate
owners if a need for such requirements is demonstrated. Registra-
tion should not be required nor should benefits be offered to trade-
mark owners in interstate commerce which are unavailable through
the national act. The latter practice would recreate competitive,
multiple jurisdiction problems for marks in interstate commerce
and would conflict with the intent of the Lanham Act.
If a need for a state trade-mark law exists, it is created by
unusual local conditions. However, neither an optimum nor, for
that matter, a perceptible degree of urgency for intrastate protec-
tion has ever been demonstrated. Nor is the writer aware of any
adequate sampling of local trade-mark owners, since the enactment
of the Lanham Act, to determine whether a need, sufficient to
warrant state legislation, prevails. Over the years, such need has
not been articulated or demonstrated. As a matter of fact, the
analyses of the urgings for state legislation reveal the intrastate
trade-mark owners as being conspicuously silent in this regard,
Too often, the state legislation receives its support from groups
that sell services in obtaining state registrations and from adminis-
trative bureaus, the latter having a direct or a vestigal interest in the
program. 12 Before present state trade-mark laws are amended, in
conformance with uniform or other rules, a careful study of local
conditions should be made. Particularly, the requirements of local
businessmen should be ascertained to determine whether, with the
advent of the Lanham Act, the continuation of a state trade-mark
act is desired or needed. In that connection, the protection offered
11 Sm. RE. No. 1333, 79th CONG., 2d Srss. (1946).
12The Connecticut experience, described by Mr. Kenneth Perry, Vice-
President and General Counsel of Johnson & Johnson, illustrates this point.
He states, "Not one single manufacturer spoke in support of the bill. Not one
single trade-mark owner spoke in support of the bill. Not one single busi-
nessman engaged exclusively in intrastate commerce testified in support of
the bill. But the bill had support, apart from the senator who introduced
it and the attorney who drafted the bill, from a bureau that sells services in
obtaining state registrations." Perry, op. cit. note 5. at 286.
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local commerce by common law trade-marks and the law of un-
fair competition should be appraised. If the investigation engenders
little support for state legislation from intrastate owners of trade-
marks, the state provisions as to trade-marks should be repealed,
rather than unified or stratified.
The comments of some legal scholars, critical of the practice
of romanticizing common law traditions, could be directed with
equal force at legislative predilections. 3 Despite the absence of the
original or the real justification for enacted statute law, legislatures
generally are not given to reconsider and to revaluate the factors
determinative of earlier legislation. Often such law remains on the
statute books, inactive or obsolete, or unitary or clarifying
amendments are initiated with only superficial thought given to
original objectives and current requisiteness. The revised trade-
mark law of Ohio apparently falls within the latter category.
However, the very bulk and diffusion of statute law and the
mass of bills introduced at each legislative session are not conducive
to scientific and exhaustive perceptual evaluation. The inordinate
demands made on the time of the legislators for the performance
of non-lawmaking functions have added substantially to the cares
of already overtaxed and overworked public officials. The hope
prevails that the current program in Ohio for integrating and ex-
panding the legislative services (Amended S.B. 76) will facilitate
research, encourage deliberation, and provide an objective medium
for the study of current and past legislative measures and their
policies.
Tn3 Nz-w OHno TFADE-MURK ACT
Notwithstanding the cognitive policy defections of the new
Ohio Trade-Mark Act, its appraisal is compelling.
The salient objectives of the law are: 1) to consolidate the
registration requirements under one procedure and 2) to establish
standards for refusal of registration by the Secretary of State.
Uniform filing requirements are stipulated in Section 1329.56
of the Revised Code. Under the earlier practice, the secretary
could not refuse the registration of a trade-mark if the application
was in the proper form and was accompanied by the fixed fee.
Registration under the new law may be refused in accordance with
the standards outlined in Section 1329.55 of the Revised Code.
Registration of a trade-mark under the new Act shall be ef-
fective for a term of ten years from the date of registration and
13 MVr. Justice Holmes' critical comment on the sanctity of traditional
common law is equally applicable to statute law: "It is ... revolting if the
grounds upon which it (the law) was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind irmtation of the past." Horzns, CoLLECTED
LmAi. PAPERs 187 (1921).
[Vol. 14
STATE TRADE-MARKS AND MARKS
may be renewed for successive periods of ten years in like manner.
The filing fee is ten dollars and the renewal charge is five dollars.
Limiting the term of registration and the periodic elimination of
abandoned and other trade-marks will facilitate the maintenance
of an active registration file.
A registration in force on the effective date of the Act, October
1, 1954, shall expire ten years from the date of registration or of
the last renewal thereof or one year after October 1, 1954, which-
ever is later. It may be renewed by filing an application with the
Secretary of State and paying the renewal fee within six months
prior to the expiration of the registration. The secretary is re-
quired by Section 1329.59, within six months after October 1, 1954,
to notify all registrants under the former sections of the expiration
date of the registration unless renewed.
Section 1329.60 provides that "any trade-mark and its regis-
tration shall be assignable with the good will of the business in
which the trade-mark is used, or with that part of the good will of
the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the trade-
mark." The provision also provides for the recordation of the as-
signments with the Secretary of State upon the payment of a fee of
five dollars. An assignment of any registration shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration with-
out notice unless it is properly recorded within three months after
the date thereof or prior to the subsequent purchase.
The Secretary of State is required by Section 1329.62 to cancel
from the register: 1) after October 1, 1955, all registrations under
previous sections which are more than ten years old and are not
renewed, 2) any registration which is voluntarily canceled in writ-
ing by the registrant or the assignee of record, 3) all registrations
granted under Sections 1329.54 to 1329.68, inclusive, which are not
renewed, 4) any registration concerning which the Secretary of
State or a court of competent jurisdiction shall find cancelable for
the reasons set forth in Section 1329.62 (D), and 5) when a court
of competent jurisdiction shall order cancellation of a registration
on any ground.
The Secretary of State is required to keep for public examin-
ation a record of all trade-marks registered or renewed and to
establish a classification of goods conforming to the classification
formulated by the United States Commissioner of Patents.
Damages are recoverable by or on behalf of a party injured
from any person who procures the filing or registration of a trade-
mark by knowingly making any false or fraudulent representation
or declaration.
The conferring of additional remedies for infringement is an
advantage of trade-mark registration under some state statutes
1953]
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over the common law practice. Section 1329.65 of the Revised Code
states that any person who infringes a registered trade-mark shall
be liable to a civil action by its owner for any or all of the remedies
provided in Section 1329.66. Certain exceptions to recovery are
listed under the section.
The remedies available under Section 1329.66 are: 1) in-
junctive relief, 2) payment by the defendants to the trade-mark
owner of all profits derived from and all damages suffered by rea-
son of the infringement, 3) destruction of the trade-mark counter-
feits or imitations in the possession or under the control of a de-
fendant, and 4) penal law.
The section provides, however, that where the infringement
is part of paid newspaper or periodical advertising, the remedies
against the publisher or distributor shall be limited to an in-
junction against the presentation of the advertising matter in future
issues. These limitations apply only to innocent infringers.
The Act preserves the rights in trade-marks acquired at any
time at common law, and makes the functions created by the Act
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, Sections 119.01 to
119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code. Finally, the new trade-mark
law is to become effective on October 1, 1954.
THE UxIFoRm STATE TRADE-MAU ACT
In 1947, Mr. Kenneth Perry expressed the view that there will
be no occasion for any uniform state trade-mark act, unless it be
a very simple one.14 He urged that there be a respite in state trade-
mark legislation until the Lanham Act has "exercised its proper
influence."'15 Whether there has been an adequate lapse of time
since the federal law became operative, to determine the nature
and the extent to which state legislation is required, is problematic.
It is certain, however, that the need for state law is in inverse
proportion to the effectiveness of the Lanham Act.16 In consonance
with the federal law, the only basis for a state act, if a need can
be demonstrated, would be to extend additional protection to trade-
marks of intrastate owners. With that objective in mind, it appears
that the uniform act is less effective and less inclusive than a
"little Lanham Act"' 7 would be. To illustrate, the latter law, among
other benefits, would permit registration of service, collective and
certification marks, symbols which are not covered by the uni-
14 Perry op. cit. note 5, at 286.
IS Id. at 287.
16 Dr. Walter Derenberg thinks that "Most state registration statutes are
of little, if any, value to trade-mark owners and vill prove even less so under
the new act (Lanham Act). . . . The more effective federal trade-mark
legislation, the smaller the need for state laws." Quoted in ibd.
17By the "Little Lanham Act" is meant the embodiment of the es-
sence of the Lanham Act as applied to trade-marks in intrastate commerce.
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form act. Also, the additional features of incontestability, construc-
tive notice, and concurrent registration are provided by the Lan-
ham Act. With the present repeal of the union label provisions in
the Ohio code, their exclusion from the uniform act and their cover-
age by a "little Lanham Act," the advantages of the latter law are
further demonstrated.
MAMKS OF OWNERSmP
Amended Senate Bill No. 262 is a companion to the new trade-
mark act in Ohio. This act provides for the registration of names,
marks or devices of ownership on articles or supplies intended for
re-use in the normal course of trade by the registrants. Ownership
of the articles or supplies remains in the registrants. "Articles and
supplies," as covered by Section 1329.41 (D) of the law include
"towels, coats, aprons, toilet devices and accessories therefor sup-
plied for hire or compensation, and vessels, receptacles and utensils
used as packages or containers in the sale and distribution of any
natural or processed product, compound, mixture, or substance,
or any combination thereof, and parts and accessories for such
vessels, receptacles, and utensils."
Section 1329.42 provides the procedure for filing with the Secre-
tary of State names, marks or devices to indicate ownership of
articles or supplies. Upon compliance with the requirements of
Sections 1329.41 to 1329.53, inclusive, including the payment of a
filing fee of ten dollars, the Secretary of State is authorized to
issue a certificate to the person claiming ownership of the articles
or supplies. Contrary to the trade-mark act, registration here is for
an unlimited time.
All certificates of ownership issued prior to this Act shall be
canceled on October 1, 1955, unless renewed in accordance with
Section 1329.42. Prior certificates shall be effective until October 1,
1955, and shall be entitled, during this period, to all of the benefits
of the Act.
Certificates are assignable with the sale of the articles or sup-
plies and the assignments may be recorded upon the payment of
a fee of five dollars to the Secretary of State. The secretary is
required by Section 1329.46 to keep for public examination a
record of all names, marks or devices filed.
Registration can be canceled by the Secretary of State only:
1) when a voluntary request for cancellation is received from the
registrant or from the assignee of record or 2) when a court of
competent jurisdiction shall order cancellation. Nor can the secre-
tary refuse certification upon proper filing and payment of the fee.
Section 1329.49 states that no person: 1) shall dispose of or
traffic in articles or supplies, fill or re-fill any container upon which
a name, mark or device has been certified, 2) shall refuse to re-
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turn the articles or supplies on demand of the owner, or 3) shall
deface, obliterate or otherwise remove or conceal a name, mark
or device, unless consent of the owner is obtained or unless the
articles or supplies shall have been purchased from the owner.
The possession by any dealer in second-hand materials without
the written consent of the registrant of any articles or supplies
upon which a name, mark or device has been produced shall be
presumptive evidence of a violation of the Act.
If a registrant shall state under oath before a justice of the
peace or court of competent jurisdiction his belief that a violation
of the Act is occurring with respect to one or some of his articles
or supplies, the justice or court must thereupon issue a search
warrant to discover and obtain them. The person in whose posses-
sion the articles or supplies are found shall be brought before the
justice or court to explain the circumstances of possession. If the
justice or court finds that the person is guilty of any of the of-
fenses enumerated in the Act, the punishment prescribed in division
(I) of Section 1329.99 of the Revised Code shall be imposed and
possession of the articles or supplies obtained upon the warrant
shall be awarded to the owner thereof.
Pursuant to Section 1329.99 (I), whoever violates the Act shall
be fined not less than ten nor more than fifty dollars or imprisoned
not less than ten days nor more than one month, or both, for a
first offense. For each subsequent offense, the person shall be fined
not less than twenty nor more than one hundred dollars, or im-
prisoned not less than thirty days nor more than three months, or
both.
As with the new trade-mark act, this law shall become effective
on October 1, 1954.
CONCLUSION
Careful study of local needs should determine the efficacy of
state trade-mark legislation. In the absence of compelling demands
by intrastate trade-mark owners, the state laws should be repealed
rather than standardized or unified. If legislation is required, then
it should reflect the maturest deliberation, embodying the schemata
for the protection of local interests consistent with the federal law.
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